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BROKERAGE INDUSTRY* 
MICHAELS. KNOLL 
Debevoise & Plimpton 
I. THE PROBLEM 
THE purpose of this article is to examine the socially efficient class of 
brokerage-fee rules. It is a commonly observed phenomenon that real 
estate brokers charge a fee of about 6 percent of the sale price on private 
homes. 1 The tendency for the brokerage fee to increase with the price of 
the item sold has been observed in other markets as well.2 There is, 
however, no reason to expect that a 6 percent rule, or any other class of 
rules where the brokerage fee is not fixed independently of the price of the 
property, is efficient; for it costs no more to sell a relatively expensive 
piece of property than to sell a relatively inexpensive one.3 There has also 
been considerable speculation that the traditional brokerage-fee arrange-
ment is anticompetitive. The argument, which is that brokers are engaging 
in price discrimination by charging the owners of expensive houses more 
• I would like to thank Richard Boltuck, Dennis Carlton, Siddharth Tiwari, George Tol-
ley, an anonymous referee, and participants in the Urban Economics Workshop at the 
University of Chicago for their helpful comments and suggestions. The views expressed in 
this article are solely those of the author, who alone is responsible for any remaining errors. 
1 See, for example, Bruce Owen, Kickbacks, Specialization, Price Fixing, and Efficiency 
in Residential Real Estate Markets, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 931, 947 (1977). 
2 For example, the usual brokerage fee for a lease on a rent-stabilized apartment in 
Manhattan is one and one-half months' rent. For commercial real estate, the standard 
brokerage fee on a lease is 3 percent of the rental value of the lease. 
3 It may cost somewhat more to show a twenty-three-room house than to show an eight-
room house, but it probably does not cost three times as much. There are other costs 
involved that are uqielated to the sale price: making trips out to the house, listing the house 
in the appropriate ways, contacting prospective purchasers, and arranging for financing. 
Furthermore, depending on the locations of the two houses, an eight-room house in a 
desirable location may sell for more than a twenty-three-room house in an undesirable one, 
or the twenty-three-room house might cost ten times as much as the eight-room house. 
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for the same service, is largely based on the observation that the bro-
kerage fee is an increasing function of the price of the property sold.4 It 
does not follow, however, that the brokerage industry is anticompetitive 
just because the brokerage fee is an increasing function of the price of the 
property, because a brokerage fee that increases with the sale price is 
consistent with a competitive market. 
In addition, the contingent brokerage-fee contract plays an important 
role in ensuring that brokers provide the agreed-upon effort. The broker is 
the owner's agent and has the agent's usual incentive to shirk. The contin-
gent contract provides the broker with an interest in making the sale and, 
therefore, reduces shirking. Furthermore, the owner, by using a multiple 
listing service to sell the house, may be able to eliminate shirking entirely. 
II. THE INTUITIVE SoLUTION 
A partial answer to the question, Why do brokerage fees generally 
increase with the price of the property sold? comes from recognizing that 
ownership is costly and that the total cost of ownership is directly related 
to the duration of ownership. Consider a builder who has borrowed 
$100,000, at an interest rate of 12 percent a year, to build and subse-
quently to sell a house for $125,000, which is going to take one year to 
build. If the builder sells the house at the end of the year, he will make a 
profit of$13,000.5 If, however, it takes an additional three months for him 
to sell the house, his profit will be $10,000.6 
The cost to the builder of owning the house is not only a function of the 
interest rate and the length of time it takes to sell the house; it is a function 
of the price of the house as well. The lost interest income, assuming that 
the borrowing and lending rates are the same, is proportional to the price 
of the house, where the constant of proportionality is the interest rate. 
Therefore, the cost to the builder of owning the house is an increasing 
function of its selling price, of how long it takes to complete the sale, and 
of the rate of interest. 
The builder, by selling the house one month earlier, would save the 
monthly interest cost. Thus the builder would be willing to pay up to the 
monthly interest cost, which is directly related to the price of the house, 
-4 See Owen, supra note 1, at 947 n.l09, 948 n.lll. 
5 This is not an economic profit, but a return to the builder on his investment. 
6 With a discount rate of 12 percent, the present value of $10,000 three months from now 
is $9,704. Thus, the present value of the builder's profit is $296 more if he sells the house 
today instead of three months later. 
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to sell the house one month earlier.7 There is, however, no market where 
the rapidity with which a house is sold can be purchased directly. The 
demand for brokerage services is indirectly the demand for such a ser-
vice. 
The more time and effort a broker dedicates to selling any one particu-
lar house, by contracting and showing the house to potential purchasers,8 
the higher is its probability of sale. A broker's time, like anyone else's, is 
limited and valuable. Thus the broker must allocate his time and effort 
among the houses he is trying to sell. Because the interest income gain 
from an earlier sale is directly related to price received, the demand for 
brokerage services is greater, the greater is the selling price. Therefore, 
an owner would purchase more brokerage services, the more expensive is 
the property to be sold.9 This implies that the contingent brokerage fee 
would be an increasing function of the price of the house. This result is 
based only on the demand for brokerage services. It is not based on the 
assumption that it costs more to sell more expensive houses, nor is it 
based on the assumption that brokers have monopoly power. 
III. THE FORMAL SOLUTION10 
In order to model the provision of brokerage services, the following 
assumptions are made. Time is assumed to be in discrete units, and in 
7 In the example, the builder would be willing to pay an additional $1,250 to sell the house 
one month earlier. Compare a second house, which is being sold for $250,000, to the 
original. The monthly interest cost on this house would be $2,500, and the builder would be 
willing to pay up to $2,500 to sell this house one month earlier. Ifthere were a market where 
the builders could directly purchase the time it takes to sell their houses, the first builder 
would choose the level of services for which a sale one month earlier cost $1,250, whereas 
the second builder would choose the level of services for which a sale one month earlier cost 
$2,500. Assuming that the marginal cost of selling the house one month earlier increased as 
the selling time decreased, then the second builder would contract for more services than the 
first builder. 
8 The broker expends both time and money to sell the house. In order to make a sale, the 
broker has to contact potential purchasers and take them to see the house. If the potential 
purchasers are still interested, then the broker might get involved in negotiations between 
the potential buyer and the owner. 
9 According to this view, the broker is assumed to be a middleman bringing the willing 
buyer and seller together. The broker is not, in the colloquial sense of the phrase, a good 
salesman: someone who can talk a client into buying what he does not want. Instead, any 
inctcased effort by the broker takes the form of showing the house to more prospective 
buyers, who decide for themselves whether or not to purchase the house. Conceptually, the 
broker can be viewed as reducing information costs by providing both buyers and sellers 
with information about the housing market. 
10 This section is based in large part on William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, 
Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism. 
7 J. Legal Stud. 83 (1978). In their paper, Landes and Posner develop a one-period model to 
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each period the house is either sold or it is not sold. The probability that 
the house is sold in any period, p, is a function only of the services 
provided in that period. In the language of statistics, the trials are inde-
pendent. The builder is assumed to contract with a single broker for a 
certain level of services to be provided until the house is sold. 11 These 
assumptions imply that the sale of the house can be modeled by a Ber-
noulli process. 12 The builder is interested in the waiting time for the first 
success, which can be modeled by a geometric distribution. Denoting the 
geometric probability function by Pge, the probability of the first success 
occurring in period n is given by 
Pge(ii = nip) = q"- 1p, (1) 
where q = 1 - p. Denoting the mean waiting time by E(ii), it can be 
shown that the mean waiting time is the inverse of the probability of a 
success at any trial: 
E(n) = lip. 
Furthermore, assume that the real estate industry can be modeled by an 
urn with a large number of balls representing prospective buyers, labeled 
success and failure. 13 The number of balls that can be drawn from the urn 
explain court-determined fees for rescues. In this article, a model with an infinite number of 
periods is constructed. The notation of Landes and Posner is used to facilitate comparisons. 
There is another, much larger literature to which this essay is also related. This is the 
literature on innovation. The multiperiod model of an owner trying to sell a house is similar 
to some multiperiod models of inventors trying to develop new technologies. For a good 
survey of the literature on innovation, see Morton Kamien & Nancy Schwartz, Market 
Structure and Innovation (1982). 
11 This model presents the problem facing the owner each period. The optimal strategy for 
the builder is the same each period. This follows from the assumption of independence, 
which led to the modeling of the waiting time for the first success by a geometric distribu-
tion. The geometric distribution has the property that the probability that a random variable 
is greater than or equal to i + j, given that it is greater than i, is the unconditional probability 
that it is greater than or equal to j. What this means is that just because a builder has already 
observed i successive failures does not change the distribution of the number of trials 
required to obtain the first success. Therefore, regardless of how long the house has been on 
the market, the optimal strategy is the same each period until the house is sold. This 
assumption is relaxed in Section IV, where the price of the house is treated as a variable. 
The model developed in this section also assumes that the contract between the builder and 
the broker to provide a level of brokerage services can be easily enforced by the builder. 
This assumption is relaxed in Section IV, where the effect of the form of the brokerage 
contract on broker performance is discussed. 
12 A good survey of the statistical techniques used in this article is contained in Alexander 
Mood, Franklin Graybill, & Duane Boes, Introduction to the Theory of Statistics (3d ed. 
1974). 
13 The assumption that the trials are independent is given meaning by letting the sampling 
be done with replacement or by assuming that the urn is so large that the distortion from 
sampling without replacement is small. 
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each period is an increasing function of the expenditure on brokerage 
services. Thus the probability of a success in any given period is an 
increasing function of the number of balls drawn from the urn. 14 
The builder is assumed to operate by initially borrowing enough money 
from a bank to cover all of the construction and related expenses· of 
building the house. The house is built without a commission; instead, the 
builder intends to sell the house on the market. Once the house is sold, 
the builder will pay off the loan, pay the broker the fee, and deposit any 
remaining money from the sale in the bank. In order to make the problem 
tractable, all builders and brokers are assumed to be risk neutral. 15 
The following notation will be used throughout this article. Let y be the 
level of brokerage services, which can be measured either in broker-hours 
dedicated to selling the house or in prospective buyers who view the 
house in a single period. Let v be the average price for a unit of brokerage 
service, which is to be provided continuously until the house is sold. 
Thus, vy is the builder's payment to the broker for services contingent 
upon the sale being made. Finally, cis the broker's cost of providing one 
unit of brokerage service for one period. 16 
The probability that the broker will make the sale and earn his fee in the 
next period, assuming that he has not yet sold the house, is p. Thus, 
because the contingent fee is paid only once the sale has been made, the 
expected present value of the contingent brokerage fee, F, is given by the 
geometric series 
F = pvy + (1 - p)(pvy)/(1 + r) + ... 
+ (1 - p);(pvy)/(1 + r);pvy + ... , 
(2) 
where (1 - p/p is the probability today that the house will be sold in 
period i + 1, and (1 + r); is the discount factor that equates flows in 
period i to flows in the current period. The expected present value of the 
contingent brokerage fee, F, is the sum of the above geometric series, 
which is given by equation (3): 
F = pvy(l + r)/(p + r). (3) 
The broker will expend y units trying to sell the house each period at a 
cost of c a unit. Therefore, the broker's expected outlay is given by the 
14 Let m be the proportion of balls labeled failure and k the number of balls drawn from 
the urn each period. The probability that all of the balls drawn from the urn in a single period 
will be failures is mk. Thus, the probability of at least one success is I - mk. 
15 This assumption is relaxed in Section IV, where the form of the contract between the 
builder and the broker is discussed. 
16 In order to simplify the calculations, brokerage services are assumed to be provided at 
constant marginal cost. 
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infinite series 
cy + (1 - p)cy/(1 + r) + ... + (1 - p);cy/(1 + r); + (4) 
The expected present value of the broker's expenses, C, is the sum of 
this series: 
C = cy(l + r)l(p + r). (5) 
The expected present value of the broker's profit, B, is the difference 
between the expected present value of the contingent brokerage fee, F, 
and the expected present value of the broker's expenses, C: 
B = pvy(l + r)/(p + r) - cy(l + r)l(p + r). (6) 
A profit-maximizing broker will offer a contract specifying a contingent 
fee and a level of service such that equation (7) holds: 
dB/dy = [(p + r) - ypy][pv - c]l(p + r) + pyy[v + p(dvldp)J = 0, 
(7) 
where Py denotes the derivative of p with respect toy. Competition among 
brokers and free entry, which imply zero expected profits, force each 
broker to internalize the effect of an increase in the level of services on 
the probability of success by reducing the unit price of the service. Thus, 
to maintain expected price equal to marginal cost, which is necessary to 
obtain a contract, the broker must offer in response to an increase in p a 
compensating decrease in v. Formally, setting equation (6) equal to zero 
implies that pv - c = 0. 17 Thus, equations (6) and (7) together imply that 
dvldp = - vlp. (tsJ 
Therefore, as the probability of sale increases, builders will pay a lower 
price for each unit of brokerage services purchased. 
The loss to the builder from a later sale is the sum of the additional 
interest paid on the original loan and the interest income forgone on the 
builder's profit. Assuming an infinitely durable house with no costs of 
maintenance, 18 this loss is just the rental value of the house over the 
period prior to its sale. 19 If the probability of selling the house in any 
17 This can be seen by dividing both sides of equation (6) by y(l + r)/(p + r). 
18 This assumption is made for simplicity. Assuming the house is not infinitely durable 
would complicate the mathematics but would not change the main result: the optimal bro-
kerage fee would still be an increasing function of the price of the house. 
19 For a discussion ofthe relation between price and rental value wh:-n the property is not 
infinitely durable, see Peter Swann, Durability of Consumption Goods, 60 Am. Econ. Rev. 
884 (1970). 
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period is p and the one-period rental value is I, then the expected interest 
loss, L, is given by the following infinite series: 
L = (1 - p)l + (1 - p)2 1/(1 + r) + ... 
(9) 
+ (I _ p ); 1/(1 + r);- 1 + . . . . 
The one-period rental rate is assumed to be constant over time. The term 
(I - p); is the probability that the house has not been sold after i periods. 
Thus, the expected present value of the rental loss is given by equation 
(10): 
L = 1(1 + r)(l - p)l(p + r). (10) 
From Coase's theorem and competition, it follows that the builder and 
broker will together minimize the discounted sum of the expected interest 
loss and the cost of the brokerage services provided. Denoting this total 
cost by TL, the social problem can formally be written as 
min TL = min [(I - p)l + cy][(l + r)/(p + r)]. (11) 
y y 
Differentiating equation (11) with respect toy, and setting the resulting 
expression equal to zero, yields the first-order necessary condition for a 
maximum: 
-pyl(l + r) + c(p + r) - PyCY = 0. (12) 
The first term in equation (12) is the expected gain from an earlier ex-
pected sale when the level of brokerage services is increased. This gain is 
directly related to the rental value of the house. The last two terms are the 
expected increase in the cost of providing the higher level of brokerage 
services; this cost is independent of the rental value. Equation (12) im-
plies that expected total costs are at a minimum when an additional unit of 
brokerage services will reduce the expected interest loss just as much as it 
will increase the expected brokerage cost. The optimal level of brokerage 
services for the builder to contract for, call it y*, must be a solution to 
equation (12). 
The second-order sufficiency condition is derived by differentiating the 
first-order necessary condition, equation (12), with respect toy. In order 
for the value of y that solves equation (12) to be a minimum, the second-
order sufficiency has to be positive when evaluated at y*. Thus, for y = 
y*, equation (13) must hold: 
- Pyyl(l + r) - PyyCY > 0. (13) 
The effect of an exogenous change in the rental value on the equilibrium 
level of brokerage services is determined by an application of the implicit-
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function theorem. Totally differentiating the first-order necessary condi-
tion, equation (12), and rearranging terms yields: 
- py(l + r) + {[-Pyyl(l + r)) - Pyycy}dy*ldl = 0. (14) 
The te· m in braces in equation (14) is the second-order sufficiency condi-
tion, f;quation (13). The second-order sufficiency condition is positive 
when e• ·aluated at y*, and the first term in equation ( 14) is negative. Thus, 
dy*/dl > 0, 
which is to say that the equilibrium level of brokerage services is an 
increasing function of the rental value of the house. This is because the 
marginal value of an additional level of brokerage services is an increasing 
function of tht: rental loss. Therefore, the owner of a more expensive 
house will contr.1ct for a higher level of brokerage services. 
The equilibrium probability of making the sale in a single period is also 
an increasing function of the rent.tl value. Formally, 
dpldl = (dpldy*)(dy*/dl) > 0. (15) 
Thus, because the mean waiting time is the inverse of the probability of a 
success in any trial, the equilibrium expected waiting time is lower, the 
larger the rental value. Therefore, the model predicts that, on average, 
more expensive houses will spend less time on the market. 20 
The contingent fee received by the broker is vy. It can be shown that if 
20 This result, that on average more expensive houses will spend less time on the market, 
depends heavily on the assumption that the probability of sale depends only on the level of 
services. There are several reasons to believe that the probability of sale is also a decreasing 
function of the price of the house. First, because there is more variability in expensive 
houses than in inexpensive houses, it is probably more difficult to match buyers and sellers 
of expensive houses. Second, over some range the market becomes thinner as prices rise. 
As a result, expenditures, such as for newspaper advertisements, will reach fewer potential 
purchasers when they are for more expensive houses. Thus, advertising expenditures may 
be less effective for expensive houses. Third, because the price and the value of a house are 
not the same, there may be a tendency for low-priced houses to be underpriced and thus 
easy to sell, and for high-priced houses to be ovell)riced and thus difficult to sell. For these 
reasons, the probability of sale may not depend on the level of brokerage services alone but 
also on the price of the house. If the probability of sale were a decreasing function of the 
price of the house, as well as an increasing function of the level of services, the model would 
be more complicated. In general, assuming the function Py were not changed in the relevant 
range, then expensive houses would have relatively larger contingent brokerage fees, but 
they could have longer waiting times than inexpensive houses. The point of the article is not 
that expensive houses are sold faster than are inexpensive houses, but that owners of 
expensive houses have an incentive to pay higher contingent fees in order to induce brokers 
to provide more services. As a result, the average waiting time for expensive houses is 
shorter than it would otherwise be. Assuming that brokerage services are relatively less 
effective for expensive houses only makes the main result, that equilibrium expected waiting 
times vary directly with the price of the house, easier to prove. 
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the contingent fee is less than half of the sale price of the house, then the 
brokerage fee will be an increasing function of the brokerage services 
employed. 21 Differentiating the contingent brokerage fee with respect to 
the level of services yields 
d(vy)ldy = (dv/dp)pyy + v = -(vlp)pyy + v = v(l - e), (16) 
where e = pyylp is the elasticity of the probability of sale in the current 
period with respect to the brokerage services provided. The result that the 
contingent fee is increasing in the level of services in equilibrium implies 
that in equilibrium e is less than one. This result is used to derive a 
number of other results. 
An exogenous increase in the rental value will increase the contingent 
brokerage fee. Formally, 
d(vy)*ldl = [d(vy)*/dy*](dy*ldl) = v*(l - e*)dy*/dl > 0. (17) 
The expected present value of the contingent fee is increasing in the rental 
value. At y* the expected present value of the contingent fee must be 
increasing in the level of brokerage services, for if this were not true, the 
present value of the total loss could be reduced by increasing the bro-
kerage services. Therefore, the expected present value of the contingent 
fee is increasing in the rental value. Formally, 
d[vy(l + r)l(p + r*)]ldl = {d[vy(l + r)/(p + r)*]/dy*} dy*ldl > 0. 
(18) 
Thus, both the contingent brokerage fee and its expected present value 
are increasing functions of the price of the house. The expected total level 
of services devoted to selling the house is an increasing function of the 
rental value. Formally, 
d(ylp)*ldl = (1/p)(l - e)dy*/dl > 0. (19) 
Thus, in equilibrium, increasing the level of services by, say, 10 percent 
will reduce the expected waiting time by less than 10 percent. Therefore, 
if there are two builders who differ in that the rental value of the house 
built by the first exceeds the rental value of the house built by the second, 
21 The argument is as follows: in order for the builder's profits to be at a maximum, the 
discounted expected value of the contingent brokerage fee must be increasing in the level of 
services provided. Now assume that an incremental increase in the level of brokerage 
service raises the present value of the brokerage fee, but because it reduces the expected 
waiting time, the amount of the contingent fee actually declines. From the assumption that 
the owner's share of the sale exceeds the broker's share, increasing the level of brokerage 
services must increase the present value of the difference between the sale price and the 
brokerage fee. Therefore, at a maximum, the contingent brokerage fee must be an increasing 
function of the level of services provided. 
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then in equilibrium the first will hire more units of brokerage service, have 
a higher probability of sale, have a shorter expected waiting time, pay a 
larger fee with a larger expected present value, and when the houses are 
sold pay a lower price for each unit of service. 
Denoting the broker's share of the sale price of the house by S, the 
broker's equilibrium share of the sale price is given by equation (20): 
S = rcy/pl. (20) 
The effect of an exogenous increase in the rental value on the broker's 
share of the sale is ambiguous. Formally, 
dS/dl = (rc/p/)[(1 - e)dy*ldl - y/1], (21) 
which cannot be unambiguously signed. Thus, as the price of the house 
increases, the broker's contingent fee increases. Without further specify-
ing the relation between the service provided and the probability of sale, it 
cannot be determined whether the broker's share of the sale price is 
increasing or decreasing with the sale price of the house. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
In the preceding section, I showed that the optimal contract between a 
broker and a seller has the seller paying a larger fee the more expensive is 
the property. In this section, I examine the factors that tend to cause 
houses to come onto the market at the optimal price with the optimal level 
of services devoted to their sale. In addition, the advantages of a contin-
gent contract over a fee-for-service arrangement are examined. In order 
to discuss these issues, it is first necessary to draw a distinction between 
the price and the value of a house, a distinction which has so far been 
ignored. Clearly, the value of a house is determined by its physical char-
acteristics, including the neighborhood where it is located, as well as the 
tastes, incomes, and situations of potential purchasers. On the other 
hand, the price of the house is simply the amount of money the eventual 
purchaser pays for the house. Given a house, and an initial level of bro-
kerage services, the higher the asking price for the house, the fewer 
people will be willing to pay the price. 22 Thus, given the house and the 
level of brokerage services, the higher the asking price, the longer is the 
expected waiting time for the sale.23 
22 Conceptually the urn can be viewed as containing many balls with different numbers on 
them. These numbers are the reservation prices of different buyers for the same house. The 
higher the asking price, the fewer buyers will have a reservation price above the asking price 
and, thus, the lower will be the proportion of successes. 
23 See Saul Levmore, Efficient Markets and Puzzling Intermediaries, 70 Va. L. Rev. 645, 
663-68 (1984). 
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Given a price-fee schedule for the market, the broker will try to sell the 
house below the price that maximizes the builder's expected profits sub-
ject to zero profits in the brokerage industry. In this way, the broker will 
be able to earn a positive expected profit. If the broker then expends the 
usual amount of services for houses being sold at the lower asking price, 
the builder's house will have an unusually large probability of sale. 
Even if each builder hires only one broker, if each builder first receives 
bids from a number of competing brokers stipulating the contingent fee 
and the selling price of the house, then the house will go on the market at 
the price that maximizes the expected present value of the builder's 
profit. Thus, if the first broker suggests a selling price below the optimal 
level with the standard fee for that selling price, a second broker can 
suggest a higher price with the standard fee for that price. The second 
broker, as long as he bids a price below the optimal level, can both earn 
positive expected profits and offer the builder a higher expected profit 
than if the builder accepts the first offer. This, however, as is usually the 
case in these stories, is not the end. Brokers will have expected profits as 
long as the selling price is below the optimal level. Thus, the competi-
tively offered package will converge to the optimal package. 
The analysis when the suggested selling price exceeds the optimal price 
is similar. No broker would be willing to sell the house above the optimal 
price for the standard fee, because his expected profits would be negative. 
If a broker tried to sell the house at a price above the optimal level in a 
package in which his expected profits were positive, then a second broker 
could offer to sell the house at a lower price and at a fee that would yield 
him positive expected profits as well as increasing the builder's expected 
profits. This process will also converge to the optimal combination of the 
price and the contingent fee. Thus, the system in which brokers bid for 
the right of being the sole broker for a house by offering combinations of 
price and fee will lead to houses coming on the market at the efficient 
price. The importance of the above result is that a builder, even if he does 
not know what is the optimal price for his product, will find his house 
coming onto the market at the optimal price. 24 
The second issue is whether brokers will apply the optimal level of 
services or shirk. To discuss this issue, the assumption that the builder 
24 The builder, however, will have to know something about the brokerage industry, 
specifically, how long it will take on average to sell the house. This is because the builder 
and the broker are not simply interested in their price and fee but in their present values. If 
time were not a factor, then the builder would choose the broker who made the bid with the 
greatest difference between the selling price and the contingent brokerage fee. If sellers 
ignore this effect, they will tend to charge too high a price for their houses and take too long 
to sell them. 
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can perfectly and costlessly monitor the broker's activity must be re-
laxed. Thus, the builder can no longer enforce a contract that sets the 
level of services. Instead, the builder can only set the contingent fee. One 
broker alone dealing with a builder with an already agreed-upon price-
contingent fee combination will have an incentive to shirk, that is, to 
employ less than the agreed-upon level of services in selling the house. 
This is because the broker does not get the entire sale price when he sells 
the house, but only his fee. 25 
It is, thus, through competition among brokers, or enforcement by the 
builder, tqat the agreed-upon services will be provided. 26 The multiple 
listing system ("MLS"), where a substantial part of the fee is earned by 
the broker who sells the house, is one mechanism that reduces shirking. 27 
With an MLS, once a house has been listed by a broker, all of the brokers 
who subscribe to the list can compete to sell the house. If the prearranged 
split is efficient-neither the listing nor the selling broker receives too 
much or too little-the brokers will have the appropriate incentives to 
bring the house on the market at the optimal price and to expend the 
optimal level of services trying to sell it. 28 
The contingent fee is not the only form the contract between the broker 
and the owner could take. An alternative is to have the owner pay the 
broker directly for the services.29 There are several reasons why a contin-
gent contract would be preferable to a fee-for-service arrangement. The 
first reason is risk aversion. 30 There is a random element that affects when 
25 The broker with an exclusive contract would like to maximize his profits. Formally, the 
broker's problem can be written as m:x (pvy - cy)/(p + r), where vy is constant. 
26 There are a number of factors that could reduce shirking by brokers with exclusive 
contracts. First, there is direct monitoring by the seller. Second, a broker who gets a 
reputation for shirking will have difficulty getting exclusive contracts in the future. 
27 According to Owen, a typical arrangement among members of an MLS is to allocate 75 
percent of the fee to the selling broker, 20 percent to the listing broker, and 5 percent to the 
MLS itself. Owen, supra note 1, at 946 n.l04. 
28 With a multiple listing service, a member broker will expend resources on selling a 
listed house up to the point where the expected brokerage fee just equals the cost of 
providing the service. Denote by y* the optimal level of services and by v* the corre-
sponding unit price. A member broker would be willing to spend up toy units on selling the 
house, where y is given by (y/y*)pv*y* - cy "' 0. Simplifying, the above equation implies 
pv* - c = 0, which holds at a social optimum. 
29 An analogy can be drawn to the contract between a lawyer and his client. The contract 
between a personal injury lawyer and his allegedly injured client can have the client pay the 
lawyer directly for his services, or the lawyer can be given a share of the final award. In the 
latter case, if there is no award, the lawyer receives nothing. The lawyer's contingent-fee 
contract is similar to the standard brokerage contract. 
30 Risk aversion was ignored in the model presented in the third section. In that model, in 
order to facilitate. the calculations, both brokers and owners were assumed to be risk-
neutral. 
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the house is sold.31 The broker is in a better position than the owner to 
diversify this risk because the broker can pool the risk of a long wait with 
many houses. With a contingent contract, the owner does not transfer the 
entire risk to the broker but only a portion of the total risk. The owner still 
has the risk from the rent forgone. 32 
A second reason to believe that a contingent contract is efficient is 
based on agency costs. With a fee-for-service arrangement, the broker 
has little incentive to make the sale. The broker would prefer that a 
potential buyer not purchase the house so he can continue to provide 
services, rather than that a sale be made so he can earn his fee. Once a 
buyer and seller have been found and a sale seems likely, a broker work-
ing for a contingent fee has an incentive to try to facilitate the sale. If the 
sale falls through the broker has to continue working to earn his fee, 
which will not be any larger. With a fee-for-service arrangement, the 
broker will stop earning money from the client when the sale is made. 
Thus, the fee-for-service arrangement leaves the seller and broker with 
divergent interests in completing the sale. 
Third, a fee-for-service arrangement does not lend itself to a multiple 
listing system, which is one market mechanism to discourage shirking. If 
the owner could efficiently monitor the level and quality of services pro-
vided by the broker, there would be no shirking regardless of the form of 
the contract. Because monitoring is expensive, shirking is a potential 
problem. A contingent fee reduces the incentive for the broker to provide 
little service or low-quality service. 
The model presented in this article has an interesting implication for the 
31 The formula for the variance in the length of time for a sale to occur for a given value of 
pis qlp2• · 
32 A perceptive, anonymous referee observed that sellers with an optimal contract face a 
diversifiable risk because of the variance in the waiting time for the first success. The referee 
was thus led to ask why brokers do not insure owners against a long wait by purchasing the 
houses that are offered for sale and selling them themselves. Although brokers could diver-
sify the risk from late sales by concentrating their wealth in the local housing stock, they 
would subject themselves to the risk of a decrease in the value of the housing stock. In 
addition, there are tax reasons that would make it more costly for brokers to own the houses 
they sell. First, under the old tax law, short-term capital gains were taxed at a higher rate 
than long-term capital gains. Brokers, who would frequently sell their houses within six 
months, would have been subject to the higher short-term capital gains rates. Second, in 
many instances, a sale with a leaseback to the original owner will create taxable income. 
With owner-occupied housing, the value of the housing is not included in taxable income. 
When the occupant is a renter, however, the rental payments are included in the owner's 
income. Although the owner gets a depreciation deduction when the house is rented, that 
deduction is often less than the rent. See Marvin A. Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation 
para. 1.03 (3d ed. 1982). Therefore, it is not so clear that there is a profitable, albeit unex-
ploited, opportunity for brokers to insure sellers against the risk of a late sale by directly 
buying and selling houses. 
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asking prices set by owners of occupied and unoccupied houses. In the 
case of owner-occupied housing, the loss is not as easily specified as it is 
with occupied housing. When the house is occupied, there is a subjective 
component that must be included: the value of the house to the occupant. 
This value will not be constant across owners, even if tastes are constant, 
as long as circumstances differ. The relevant loss is now equal to the old 
loss less the value of the house to the resident owner. 33 
It can be shown that the prices charged by owners of occupied houses 
will exceed the prices charged by owners of unoccupied houses. An 
owner of a house can be assumed to set a price and select a level of 
brokerage services. The probability of a sale is an increasing function of 
the level of services and a decreasing function of the price. For owners 
of occupied houses, because their loss is not the rent forgone but the 
difference between the rent forgone and the value of the house to the 
owner, raising the price of the house costs the owner less the more he 
values the house. Thus, the more the owner values the house, the higher 
the price he will charge. 
In today's highly mobile society, most of the houses sold each year are 
not new, unoccupied houses but houses occupied by their owners. This 
does not mean that the paradigm of the unoccupied house is necessarily 
inappropriate for the market in general. As a rule, 25 percent of income is 
spent on housing. Thus, an individual who is offered a job in another 
region that starts at his convenience with a 25 percent increase in pay (this 
percentage increase expected to continue) will find himself in the same 
situation as the builder. Alternatively, an individual who is offered ajob 
starting immediately that increases the present value of his income stream 
by enough to cover the cost of relocating, which includes the cost of 
selling the old house, will be in the same position as the builder. If these 
two examples represent the majority of sales, the model will still be ap-
propriate. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The model using the unoccupied builder's house as a paradigm is based 
on the realization that the ownership of property entails costs, regardless 
of whether the services of the property are being erijoyed. These costs 
vary directly with the price of the property. Thus, the gains from selling 
the property sooner vary directly with the price of the property. By in-
creasing the level of services, the probability of selling the house sooner 
can be increased. Therefore, the investment in selling the house, the 
33 If the house is rented to a third party, its value to its owner is just the rent. 
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contingent brokerage fee, varies directly with the selling price of the 
house. Consequently, it does not follow that brokers are engaging in 
monopolistic price discrimination just because the brokerage fee is an 
increasing function of the selling price. 
This article has not established the efficiency of the 6 percent rule or 
any other straight percentage rule~ it has argued only for the efficiency of 
a rule that is an increasing function of the rental value. This result was 
derived assuming that both the cost and the effectiveness of brokerage 
services were the same for all houses on the market. 
In addition, competition among brokers to list and to sell houses will 
result in houses coming on the market at optimal prices and with the 
optimal amount of brokerage services dedicated to their sale. Finally, the 
formal model presented here is not specific to the American, private 
residence housing market. It is applicable to any market in which both 
buyers and goods are unique and sales occur at uncertain dates so that 
there are gains from search. Thus, the formal model can be applied to a 
variety of markets where brokers are used. 
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